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Recently, there has been strong 
public outrage against current pay 
practices for corporate CEOs, regard-
ver the past few years, there has been strong 
public outrage against current pay practices 
for corporate CEOs. To deal with this issue, 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act signed into law by President 
Obama on July 21, 2010 will allow shareholders to vote 
on executive pay packages and federal regulators to 
oversee executive compensation at financial firms. Are 
there problems with CEO pay? According to a recent 
survey, 98 percent of respondents from major financial 
institutions “believe that compensation structures were a 
factor underlying the crisis.” In this article, Rocco Huang 
outlines what we know about how CEOs are paid, how 
the pay is set, how CEO compensation affects CEOs’ 
incentives and actions and their firms’ performance, and 
how government regulations affect CEO pay.
ing both their high level relative to 
that of ordinary workers and their 
perceived insensitivity to poor per-
formance. A search of the key words 
“executive compensation” in the New 
York Times returns 168 articles for the 
first six months of 2009 and only 23 
during the same months in 2008 — 
a sevenfold increase. In June 2009, 
President Obama appointed Kenneth 
Feinberg as the special master for 
executive compensation (known in 
the media as the “pay czar”) to oversee 
the compensation of top executives at 
companies that have received federal 
bailout assistance. To deal with this 
issue, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
signed into law by President Obama 
on July 21, 2010 will allow shareholders 
to vote on executive pay packages and 
federal regulators to oversee executive 
compensation at financial firms.
Are there problems with CEO 
pay? According to a recent survey by 
the Institute of International Finance 
(IIF), 98 percent of respondents from 
major financial institutions “believe 
that compensation structures were a 
factor underlying the crisis.” By analyz-
ing executive compensation data, 
financial economists have improved 
their understanding of CEO pay. We 
know a lot about how CEOs are paid, 
how the pay is set, how CEO compen-
sation affects CEOs’ incentives and 
actions and firm performance, and 
how government regulations affect 
CEO pay.
HOW ARE CEOs PAID? 
The structure of CEO pay is more 
complicated than just a base salary 
plus bonus. Their pay packages are not 
just bigger; they are also very differ-
ent from those of ordinary workers. 
We need to understand the special 
structure of CEOs’ packages before we 
can say anything about whether they 
are paid too much. Unless otherwise 
stated, we will focus on CEO pay prac-
tices in the United States because they 
have been much better researched.
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erage, half of a CEO’s total compensa-
tion. We may think that a CEO is paid 
a bonus for better performance. But 
the evidence suggests otherwise. Kevin 
Murphy has combed through the 
research of his fellow economists and 
finds no evidence of a significant rela-
tionship between the size of a CEO’s 
cash bonus and the firm’s performance, 
measured as return on equity or stock 
returns. And indeed, Yaniv Grinstein 
and Paul Hribar find that CEOs were 
as likely to receive bonuses for making 
acquisitions that negatively affected 
shareholder wealth (as measured by 
negative stock returns upon announce-
ment of the acquisition news) as well 
as for acquisitions that increased share-
holder wealth.1 Thus, CEOs receive 
a bonus for an acquisition whether or 
not shareholders believe the acquisi-
tion increases their wealth.2
 If cash bonuses are not much 
different from base salaries except that 
they are paid at the end of the year 
instead of every month, what motivates 
CEOs to work harder and to make bet-
ter decisions for the company? Equity-
based compensation such as stock 
options plays an important role. 
An option is a contract that 
gives the owner the right, but not the 
obligation, to buy or sell an underlying 
asset at a specific price on or before 
a certain date. CEOs are typically 
awarded options allowing them to 
purchase company stock on a future 
date but at the stock price prevailing 
at the time the option is granted, thus 
allowing CEOs to benefit from future 
stock-price appreciation if the company 
performs well. Naturally, stock options 
reward CEOs for better performance 
if better performance leads to higher 
future stock prices. Indeed, Brian Hall 
and Jeffrey Liebman’s study finds that, 
unlike cash bonuses, stock options 
make CEO pay very sensitive to com-
pany performance. 
For example, in their sample, Hall 
and Liebman  find that, for a moderate 
change in firm performance (moving 
from a median stock-price performance 
to a 70th percentile performance), a 
CEO’s compensation increases more 
than 50 percent, which represents an 
increase in CEO wealth of about $1.8 
million. Most of the increase comes 
from appreciation in the value of stock 
options. That’s a large reward for im-
proving a company’s performance from 
middle of the pack to better than 70 
percent of its peers. 
Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv 
Grinstein show that the level of CEO 
compensation in the United States had 
been increasing in the decade before 
the stock market downturn in 2001, 
and the lion’s share of the increases re-
sulted from equity-based compensation 
such as stock options (see the figure).3 
Finally, another important source 
of compensation for CEOs is their 
pensions. CEOs stay in their positions 
for six years, on average. According to 
Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson, 
the executives’ pension plans had a 
median actuarial value of $15 million. 
The ratio of the executives’ pension 
value to the executives’ total compen-
sation during their service as CEO had 
a median value of 34 percent. That 
is, more than a quarter of the money 
the CEO receives from the company 
comes after his or her retirement. 
They also find that, in contrast to 
stock options, CEOs’ pensions do not 
depend much on their performance 
on the job. Poorly performing CEOs 
do not get less pension money after 
retirement. After a CEO retires, he is 
seldom in the media spotlight, and few 
people bother to look into the pay-
check of a retired CEO. Bebchuk and 
Jackson’s research, however, illustrates 
that the omission of pension plan val-
ues by researchers and the media leads 
to significant overestimation of the 
extent to which executive pay is linked 
to performance. 
Finally, the composition of CEO 
compensation is somewhat different in 
commercial banks. (See What’s Differ-
ent About Compensation for Commercial 
Bank CEOs?)
Compensation Practices Out-
side the U.S. There are relatively few 
academic studies on CEO pay practices 
outside the United States. The several 
studies that have been conducted sug-
gest that, in other countries, CEO pay 
is much lower and stock options play a 
much less important role. A study by 
Martin J. Conyon, John E. Core, and 
Wayne R. Guay compares the larg-
est 250 British companies with about 
1,200 U.S. firms of similar size and 
1 The change in stock price after the announce-
ment reflects how shareholders believe the 
acquisition is affecting their financial interests. 
The stock price declines if shareholders believe 
that the announcement is bad news.
2 Note that it is certainly possible that the 
CEOs may be right and the shareholders may be 
wrong about the acquisition’s eventual benefits 
and costs.
                                         
for CEOs is their pensions.
3 Taxation and accounting considerations partly 
contributed to the popularity of equity-based 
compensation. Section 162(m) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, enacted in 1993, places a $1 
million limit on the deductibility (against 
corporate profits) of non-performance-related 
executive compensation, giving rise to a tax 
advantage for equity-based compensation. 
Furthermore, until 2006 when it became 
mandatory, firms were not required to count 
stock option grants to executives as expenses on 
their income statement, allowing them to report 
higher earnings.14   Q3  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
finds that, in 1997, the median pay of 
a U.S. CEO was more than twice the 
median pay of a British CEO. But the 
gap is shrinking: In 2003 the median 
pay of a U.S. CEO was only 30 percent 
more.  However, the personal fortune 
of U.S. CEOs is tied much more closely 
to company stock-price movements. 
In 2003, their equity incentives (the 
sensitivity of the value of their stock 
and options holdings to changes in 
stock prices) were about 4.6 times 
greater than those of UK CEOs. After 
adjusting for what is reasonably needed 
to compensate U.S. CEOs for bearing 
the higher risk of equity-based com-
pensation, the researchers find that the 
risk-adjusted pay for the U.S. CEOs is 
not consistently higher than that for 
UK CEOs. 
CEOs SET THEIR OWN PAY 
WHEN THEY CAN 
CEO Compensation Is High 
When the Board Is Weak. Your 
bosses set your pay, but who sets the 
pay for the CEO? The board of direc-
tors (in the U.S. representing the inter-
ests of shareholders, and in some other 
countries, other stakeholders as well) 
supervises a CEO and sets his pay. It 
has become more common for the full 
board to delegate a compensation com-
mittee to set a CEO’s pay. Normally, 
the human resources department 
makes an initial recommendation. 
Then the compensation committee 
reviews the recommendation and, if 
necessary, revises it, sometimes with 
input from compensation consulting 
firms such as Towers Perrin. Finally, 
the full board of directors votes on the 
CEO pay proposal.
Strictly speaking, there is no such 
thing as “CEOs without bosses,” unless 
the CEO happens to be the majority 
owner of the company, a rarity among 
large corporations. Let’s rephrase the 
question:  Who sets the pay for the 
CEOs who are effectively their own 
bosses because they have more power 
than the board of directors? 
A CEO has financial incentives 
to persuade the board of directors and 
influence the pay-setting procedure 
in a direction that enriches him. The 
outcome of the bargaining depends on 
the CEO’s relative influence vis-à-vis 
the board of directors’. Below we pres-
ent some evidence that in firms where 
the CEOs are more powerful, they are 
paid more. (For alternative views on 
how higher CEO pay can better serve 
the interests of shareholders, see Maybe 
It’s Really Worth Paying Top Dollar for 
Managers.)
A study by John Core, Robert 
Holthausen, and David Larcker identi-
fies the following corporate board 
arrangements as potential causes of a 
weaker board vis-à-vis the CEO. First, 
having a large number of directors on 
the board can make the board weaker 
because it’s harder for a large board 
to coordinate and override the CEO’s 
wishes. Second, more of the outside 
directors — that is, the directors who 
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the firm — have been appointed by 
the CEO.4 Third, more of the “outside 
directors” are borderline insiders; that 
is, the director or his employer receives 
payments from the company in excess 
of his board pay. Examples include a 
board member who is a partner in a 
law firm that provides services to the 
company or one who is a supplier that 
sells products to the company. Fourth, 
more of the outside directors are busy; 
that is, the director serves on three or 
more other boards. Finally, the CEO is 
the chairman of the board and makes 
himself literally the boss of his sup-
posed bosses. 
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 
then show that companies with such 
boards give their CEOs higher pay. 
However, it is important to note that 
a correlation between CEO pay and 
certain firm characteristics, such 
as board size, does not necessarily 
equal causality and results should be 
interpreted with some caution. For 
example, certain types of complex 
businesses may require a higher quality 
CEO (and hence one who earns higher 
pay), a larger board to provide a broad 
array of advice, more insider execu-
tives on the board to supply opera-
tional information, more outsiders with 
connections in the industry through 
board memberships, and a CEO who 
is also the chairman in order to reduce 
coordination problems. These correla-
tions do not necessarily prove that, for 
example, having a larger board results 
in higher CEO pay.
Pay for Performance or for Good 
Luck? A study by Marianne Bertrand 
and Sendhil Mullainathan finds that 
CEOs are rewarded for good luck.  
First, let me explain what I mean 
by good luck. For a petroleum com-
pany with large oil reserves, profits 
increase with oil prices, but the CEO 
should take no credit for this windfall. 
For a company that exports goods to 
foreign countries, when the U.S. dollar 
gets cheaper, profits go up. Again, the 
CEO does nothing to make this hap-
pen. These are examples of good luck 
and have no relationship to the CEO’s 
efforts.
Ideally, CEO pay should not be 
tied to luck, that is, factors that affect 
firm performance that are beyond 
the CEO’s control. The effect of 
good luck should be filtered out when 
setting CEO pay. However, using 
several measures of luck, Bertrand 
and Mullainathan find that CEO pay 
in fact responds as much to a dollar 
earned through luck as to a dollar 
earned through CEO effort. For every 
one-percentage-point rise in account-
ing returns due to changes in oil prices 
or the exchange rate, they find that 
CEO pay increases by about 2 percent, 
roughly the same as the response to 
accounting returns not due to those 
lucky factors.  
Many firms have large sharehold-
ers who have a strong incentive to 
watch over the CEO and who also 
have the ability to have their voice 
heard. They are the motivated bosses. 
They pay their CEOs less for luck. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan find that 
he structure of CEO compensation at commercial banks 
differs from that in other industries. According to a study 
by Kose John and Yiming Qian, based on a sample of 120 
commercial banks from 1992 to 2000, CEOs’ pay-performance 
sensitivity is lower in banking firms than in manufacturing 
firms. In particular, the sensitivity is lower in more highly leveraged banks.
Elijah Brewer, William Hunter, and William Jackson document that 
equity-based compensation becomes more important after the Riegle-Neal Act 
of 1994. They find that, after deregulation, the equity-based component of 
bank CEO compensation increases significantly, on average, for the industry. 
Riskier banks have significantly higher levels of equity-based compensation, as 
do banks with more investment opportunities. 
After deregulation, the opportunity to acquire other banks opened 
up. Stronger incentives for CEOs may have become more important after 
deregulation. For example, Liu Yang, Haluk Unal, and Kristina Minnick 
find that higher pay-performance sensitivity leads to more value-enhancing 
acquisitions. Among those banks that acquired another bank, higher-
sensitivity banks experienced significantly better announcement returns than 
lower-sensitivity banks. Announcement returns are stock returns calculated 
in a three-day window around the announcement of acquisitions. The 
positive market reaction can be rationalized by better long-term performance. 
Following acquisitions, banks with high pay-performance sensitivity experience 
greater improvement in their operating performance as measured by the return 
on assets. 
What’s Different About Compensation
for Commercial Bank CEOs?
T
4 In a more recent paper, Jeff Coles, Naveen 
Daniel, and Lalitha Naveen call them “co-
option board members.”for each additional large shareholder 
(defined as a shareholder, other than 
the CEO, who owns blocks of at least 5 
percent of the firm’s common shares), 
the pay-for-luck effect declines by 10 
percent. For each additional large 
shareholder who also has a seat on 
the board of directors, the pay-for-luck 
effect declines by 33 percent. And in a 
firm without any large shareholders, a 
CEO who has spent nine years in the 
position has about a 35 percent greater 
pay-for-luck effect than one who is just 
starting at the firm. The overall results 
suggest that CEOs without bosses seem 
to set their own pay and they set it to 
their own advantage. 
No one can have good luck all the 
time. Are CEOs punished for bad luck? 
Gerald Garvey and Todd Milbourn 
show that they aren’t. They find that 
luck affects pay less when the luck is 
bad than when it is good. Their study 
finds that the average executive loses 
25 to 45 percent less pay from bad luck 
than is gained from good luck. 
Backdating: How to Make Your 
Own Luck. CEOs also seem to be able 
to influence the timing of stock option 
awards in their favor. In a recent study, 
Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein, and 
Urs Peyer posit that the practice of 
option backdating is more likely when 
the CEO is more powerful than the 
board of directors, which is supposed 
to monitor and discipline him. A 
backdated option is one in which the 
grant date of the option is chosen 
after the date has already passed. It 
is like buying a lottery ticket after 
seeing the wining number. The three 
researchers identify options granted at 
the lowest price of the month, which 
they call “lucky options.”  Choosing 
a date when the stock price is low is 
a direct transfer from stockholders 
to the executive who exercises the 
option, since he looks back and sets 
the exercise price of the option at the 
lowest possible price.
Many CEOs seem to have more 
luck than ordinary people. The three 
researchers find that during the 
period 1996-2005, 12 percent of firms 
provided one or more lucky grants 
due to opportunistic timing. It is not 
surprising that “CEOs without bosses” 
are more likely to get lucky. Bebchuk, 
Grinstein, and Peyer find that lucky 
grants were more likely when the 
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Maybe It’s Really Worth Paying Top Dollar for Managers
T
here is plenty of evidence suggesting 
that CEOs influence their own pay for 
their own financial interest. However, 
many questions remain unanswered. 
For example, it is difficult to explain 
why compensation has increased so much in the late 
20th century compared with earlier periods, solely on the 
basis of weak corporate governance. Actually, greater 
pressure from institutional investors should have reduced 
the power of CEOs in the past two decades. The current 
corporate governance environment is not perfect, but it is 
reasonable to say that it was even worse in the early 20th 
century. 
Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier developed a 
theoretical model that attempts to explain why CEO pay 
has risen so rapidly. They find that a very small dispersion 
in CEO talent can justify large pay differences. They 
show that the six-fold increase in U.S. CEO pay between 
1980 and 2003 can be fully attributed to the six-fold 
increase in market capitalization of large companies 
during that period. Alex Edmans, a professor of finance 
at the Wharton School, has argued that “being slightly 
better can have a huge effect on firm value. It’s really 
worth paying top dollar for the most talented managers.”* 
For example, at a $20 billion company, a half-percent 
improvement in results would translate into $100 million, 
which is a huge sum of money relative to an average 
CEO’s annual pay.
Edmans and Gabaix’s review paper is a good starting 
point to read more about the emerging literature that uses 
optimal contracting theories to explain many seemingly 
inefficient CEO pay arrangements as efficient outcomes, 
for example, the recent rapid increase in pay, the low level 
of incentives and their negative correlation with firm size, 
pay-for-luck, the widespread use of options (as opposed to 
stock), severance pay and debt-like compensation such as 
pensions, and the insensitivity of incentives to risk.
 Interviewed by Knowledge@Wharton: http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=printArticle&ID=1662&language=english Business Review  Q3  2010   17 www.philadelphiafed.org
company did not have a majority of 
independent directors on the board 
or the CEO had longer tenure. Both 
factors are associated with increased 
influence of the CEO on pay-setting 
and board decision-making.  
However, the size of the gains 
from this practice is economically 
small. David Aboody and Ron Kasznik 
find that the practice increases the 
CEO’s option award value by a mean 
of $46,700 (the median is $18,500), 
representing only 2.5 percent of 
reported total CEO compensation. 
The puzzle remains: Why do wealthy 
CEOs backdate options? Christopher 
Armstrong, an accounting professor at 
the Wharton School, has speculated 
that “maybe they underestimated the 
probability of getting caught, or they 
thought everyone else was doing it and 
they were entitled.”5 At this point, we 
can only speculate on the real reasons.
CEO COMPENSATION 
STRUCTURE AFFECTS 
CORPORATE POLICY  
All of the evidence I’ve discussed 
so far concerns the division of the 
firm’s profits between shareholders and 
CEOs. But there is also evidence that 
CEO compensation affects corpo-
rate decision-making, including the 
riskiness of the firm’s operating and 
financial decisions and the firm’s ac-
counting policy
Compensation and Firm Risk. 
Many studies have shown that com-
pensation does affect CEOs’ incen-
tives and actions, and the investment, 
financial, and accounting policies they 
adopt. The general finding is that op-
tion-like compensation arrangements 
are associated with more risk-taking in 
the companies these CEOs run. Op-
tions increase in value when the firm’s 
stock price becomes more volatile. 
The CEO gains when the stock price 
is very high, but the option is simply 
not exercised when the price is low. 
Thus, everything else equal, the holder 
of the option prefers firm policies that 
increase stock price volatility.
Jeffrey Coles, Naveen Daniel, and 
Lalitha Naveen, for example, confirm 
that CEO compensation arrangements 
affect investment policy, debt policy, 
and firm risk. In firms where a large 
fraction of CEO pay is in options, 
CEOs adopt riskier policies. These 
policy choices include relatively more 
investment in research and develop-
ment, more industry focus (that is, less 
diversified activities), and higher finan-
cial leverage (that is, more debt). Chief 
financial officers’ (CFOs) compensa-
tion arrangements matter, too. Sudheer 
Chava and Amiyatosh Purnanandam 
show that in firms in which the CFO 
has greater incentive to increase risk 
because of stock options, firms use 
more short-term debt, which may cre-
ate more volatile firm performance. 
It is important to note that riskier 
policies can be both good and bad for 
the shareholders. In some cases, with-
out the stock options, a senior execu-
tive may be too risk averse (because 
he may be afraid of losing his job) and 
may fail to maximize shareholders’ 
interests. But shareholders need to 
recognize that the mix of executive 
compensation can affect corporate 
policies and set executive pay accord-
ing to the risk profile they desire.
Compensation and Dodgy Ac-
counting. Changing long-term policies 
may not have as direct and as fast an 
impact as changing short-term earn-
ings numbers in financial reports. On 
average, stock prices respond positively 
to unexpectedly better earnings num-
bers and negatively to unexpectedly 
worse ones, so CEOs have an incen-
tive to manipulate reported earnings. 
Economists have shown that equity-
based compensation is related to “earn-
ings management”: activities that may 
raise short-term earnings in financial 
reports. 
Daniel Bergstresser and Thomas 
Philippon find that the use of accrual 
accounting to manipulate reported 
earnings is more pronounced at firms 
where the CEO’s compensation is 
more closely tied to the value of his 
stock and option holdings.  Accrual 
accounting allows a firm to recognize 
revenues and costs at the time of sale 
rather than when payment is received 
or at the time of purchase rather than 
when payment is made. This gives 
accountants some discretion in timing 
revenues and costs opportunistically, 
for example, increasing short-term 
reported earnings by booking revenue 
earlier.6
Bergstresser and Philippon identify 
such “discretionary” accruals and 
show that they are more likely to be 
observed when CEOs’ compensation 
is more closely tied to the value of 
stock and option holdings. They also 
find that CEOs do benefit financially 
through such manipulations. During 
years of high accruals (that is, revenues 
and reported earnings are increased 
by accrual accounting), CEOs exercise 
5 Interviewed by Knowledge@Wharton: http://
www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=print
Article&ID=1662&language=english
6 Consider the following simple example. It is 
December, and the fiscal year for a boating 
company ends on December 31. A new client 
has just reserved 12 fishing trips for the next 
12 months. In principle, revenues should be 
matched with corresponding expenses and 
booked as each trip is actually taken. However, 
the accountant using accrual accounting can 
take a more aggressive approach and book 
the revenue now, in December, by arguing 
that the company is already incurring some 
costs in preparing for those trips. As a result, 
the boating company sharply increases its 
revenue for the fiscal year, but it also records 
an equally large accounts receivable number 
on its balance sheet because payments for the 
trips have not been received (but are expected) 
from the client. The accounting choice makes 
the reported income look better for the current 
fiscal year, but it reduces future income.18   Q3  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
an unusually large number of options. 
In addition, CEOs and other insiders 
sell large quantities of shares.  The 
selling of shares by insiders is often 
interpreted as evidence that they 
expect the stock price to fall in 
the future, as would happen if they 
expected future reported revenues to 
be low due to discretionary accruals. 
Some CEOs push the envelope 
even further. Natasha Burns and Simi 
Kedia find that CEO stock options are 
related to incidences of accounting 
misreporting. A firm has misreported if 
it later restates its financial statements 
because the original financial 
statements were not in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). They identify 215 
misreporting firms among the S&P 
1500 firms (excluding financial firms). 
These are likely to be a small subset of 
total misreporting firms because many 
others may go uncaught. 
Burns and Kedia find that a 
firm with a CEO whose stock option 
portfolio value is more sensitive to 
stock price is more likely to misreport. 
They also find that the sensitivity 
of other compensation components 
(equity, restricted stock, etc.) does 
not matter. This is a sensible result, 
because, relative to other components 
of compensation, stock options are 
associated with stronger incentives 
to misreport. Through stock options, 
CEOs can benefit from higher short-
term accounting performance (and 
higher stock price) but relatively 
limited downside risk, for example, 
the risk of getting caught and having 
to restate earnings downward. For 
instance, if a CEO owns out-of-money 
stock options with the strike price 
of $25 but the current stock price is 
$20, an increase in stock price to $26 
will greatly increase the value of his 
options, but a decline in the stock 




CEO compensation contracts 
are private agreements between the 
shareholders and the CEOs. Never-
theless, government regulations can 
affect executive compensation through 
empowering shareholders, to whom the 
CEO is ultimately answerable.  
In response to the corporate 
scandals in 2001-02, by 2003 the major 
U.S. stock exchanges had revised their 
listing standards and imposed new 
requirements for directors’ and com-
mittees’ independence, requirements 
intended to enhance board oversight.7 
The rules require that all firms have a 
majority of independent directors and 
that the compensation, nominating, 
and audit committees shall consist of 
independent directors.  
Although firms were not re-
quired to comply with the rules until 
2004, Vidhi Chhaochharia and Yaniv 
Grinstein find that many firms already 
adhered to the rules even before the 
rules became mandatory. However, in 
2000 about 12 percent of firms in their 
sample did not comply with any of the 
requirements regarding independent 
directors. Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
find a significant decrease in CEO 
compensation when those firms finally 
appointed a majority of independent 
directors to their boards and removed 
all insiders from their compensation, 
nominating, and audit committees. 
They also note that the significant 
decrease in compensation is due to a 
decrease in the option-based portion 
of the compensation. The cash portion 
of compensation shows no significant 
drop. Their results suggest that board 
structure is a significant determinant 
of the size and structure of CEO com-
pensation. Note that the rules do not 
dictate directly how much the CEOs 
should be paid but, instead, influence 
it through making the board of direc-
tors more accountable to shareholders. 
The United Kingdom experi-
mented with another law that has been 
incorporated into the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act in the U.S. In the UK, 
nonbinding advisory votes by share-
holders on executive compensation 
packages have been required for all 
listed firms since 2002; that is, share-
holders have a direct say in executive 
pay. Mary Ellen Carter and Valentina 
Zamora find that shareholders express 
their anger through voting. Their 
analysis indicates that shareholders 
disapprove of higher salaries, weak pay-
for-performance sensitivity in bonus 
pay, and greater potential dilution in 
stock-based compensation, particularly 
stock-option pay. 
Shareholders’ disapproval does not 
have a binding power on the company, 
and disapproval rates rarely exceed 50 
percent. However, the board of direc-
tors does listen and react. When share-
holder disapproval is stronger, boards 
respond and subsequently decrease 
grants of stock-option compensation to 
CEOs, without increasing base salary 
or the pay-for-performance sensitivity 
of bonus pay accordingly.
WHAT DO WE KNOW AND 
NOT KNOW? 
What can we take away from 
economists’ collective knowledge 
about CEO pay? First, there seems 
to be a disconnect between CEO 
compensation and CEO performance, 
but the problems are concentrated 
in firms where the board of directors 
is weak and large shareholders are 
not present. Second, stock options 
are an important component of 
CEO compensation, and they seem 
to correlate with more risk-taking. 
Third, government policies can indeed 
7 See Securities and Exchange Commission 
Release No. 34-48745.REFERENCES
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influence how CEOs are paid by 
empowering the shareholders and the 
board of directors. 
Many questions, however, remain 
unanswered. Bengt Holmstrom, a 
scholar of compensation and incen-
tives and himself a board member of 
a large family company with a billion 
dollars in revenue, believes that most 
existing theories do not explain the 
following two puzzles. First, if the 
8 Institutional investors held only about 10 
percent of U.S. equities in 1953 but over 70 
percent by the end of 2006.
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strong influence of CEOs on their 
own pay-setting process explains why 
they are paid so much, why has CEO 
compensation increased so much in 
the late 20th century, exactly when 
pressure from large institutional inves-
tors arguably should have reduced the 
influence of CEOs vis-à-vis the share-
holders? 8 Second, why do executive 
pay patterns in closely held companies 
such as family firms (where CEOs are 
closely monitored by well-motivated 
owners) resemble those in publicly held 
companies? These and other questions 
pose a challenge for researchers seek-
ing to explain the causes and effects of 
executive compensation practices.  B R